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contract had been formed in order to gain an advantage for himself.
In summary, it would appear that although there can be no certain
test for determining how a court will construe the language of the
offeree which might seem to add contingencies to the original offer, an
analysis of these cases seems to indicate that in determining whether
a contract has been formed, the courts look beyond the language of the
parties to the nature of the actions of the parties. If it appears that one
of the parties knowingly allowed the other to rely on him as an expected
source of gain, and subsequently, either arbitrarily, or because he has
found a better bargain, cuts the other party off from the source of
gain, it is probable that the court will construe the language in favor
of the expectant party.
HARRIET D. HOLT.
Criminal Law-Search of Private Dwelling-Incident to Arrest
In Clifton v. United States," federal revenue agents went to the
defendant's home with an informant who told the person answering his
knock that he wished to buy whiskey. He was told to see Earl Padgett,
who lived down the road. The investigators and the informant returned
to the defendant's backyard with Padgett who entered the back door and
came out with a half-gallon of non tax-paid whiskey. The investigators
paid Padgett for the whiskey, identified themselves and arrested him.
Then one of the investigators searched the defendant's home and found
illicit whiskey. The investigators had neither a warrant for the arrest
of Padgett nor a search warrant for the defendant's house. The defendant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained by this search was
denied by the trial court, and he was convicted. The Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, saying: "The search in this case was
reasonable, being incident to the arrest of Padgett. It is not necessary
that the owner be the party arrested in such a case." 2
This decision has extended the law of search incident to arrest far
beyond bounds heretofore established. The court not only sanctioned
the search of a private dwelling when the arrest took place outside the
dwelling, but also held such a search to be reasonably incident to a
lawful arrest where the party arrested was not the owner of the dwelling.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees to the people the right "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
'224 F. 2d 329 (4th Cir. 1955).
2 Id. at 331. This case is of great importance to North Carolina because this
state adopted the federal rule that evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure
is, on proper objection, inadmissible in criminal proceedings. N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15-27 (1951).
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and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." 3 This constitutional guaranty does not prohibit all searches and seizures without a
warrant, but only unreasonable ones. 4 The legal maxim, "every man's
house is his castle," applies with all its vigor to the right of search of
private dwellings, 5 and generally, under the federal and state constitutions and statutes, search of a private residence, without invitation or
consent, G may not be made without a search warrant,7 except when such
a search is incident to a lawful arrest," such search being considered
constitutionally reasonable.
It was decided at an early date that a search without a warrant of
the arrested person in order to protect the arresting officer, to deprive
the prisoner of potential means of escape or to avoid destruction of
evidence by the arrested person was reasonable 0 Later this right to
search without a warrant was extended beyond the actual person of the
one arrested to include "the place of arrest," i.e., "the area immediately
surrounding the accused" and "the premises under his immediate control." This, apparently, was to provide for the situation where the accused hurriedly disposes of the evidence by throwing it on the ground,
tossing it in a bush, or slipping it in an article of clothing hanging
nearby. 10 Thus, it has been held that where the person is arrested on his
own property the right of search extends a reasonable distance from
the place of arrest to include the land," garages, 12 sheds' 3 and other
buildings not used as a dwelling. Twenty-five feet has been held a
reasonable distance because not beyond the extent of the offender's activities;14 a similar result has been reached in the case of a barn one
hundred feet away, since it "was in the immediate vicinity of the
place where the arrest was made."' 5 But, under these circumstances
the private dwelling could not be searched. 16 Courts have held that the
'Similar or identical provisions are contained in constitutions of each of the
forty-eight states. They are collected in CORNELIUS, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 7,
pp. 46-7 (1926).
' Cannon v. United States, 158 F. 2d 952 (5th Cir. 1946) ; Joyner v. State, 157
Fla. 874, 27 So. 2d 349 (1946).
'Gorman v. State, 161 Md. 700, 158 Atl. 903 (1932); Coburn v. State, 59
Okla. Crim. 333, 60 P. 2d 399 (1936).
'Williams v. United States, 295 Fed. 219 (D. Mont. 1924); People v. Broas,
240 Mich. 495, 215 N. W. 420 (1927).
'Baxter v. United States, 188 F. 2d 119 (6th Cir. 1951); Brown v. United
States, 83 F. 2d 383 (3rd Cir. 1936).
' Roberson v. United States, 165 F. 2d 752 (6th Cir. 1948); Papani v. United
States, 84 F. 2d 160 (9th Cir. 1936).
' See MECHAN, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 13, pp. 62-4 (1950).
10 Ibid.
"Koth v. United States, 16 F. 2d 59 (9th Cir. 1927).
12 State v. Estes, 151 Wash. 51, 274 Pac. 1053 (1929).
"State v. Rotolo, 39 Wyo. 181, 270 Pac. 665 (1928).
"
Shew v. United States, 155 F. 2d 628 (4th Cir. 1946).
"Kelly v. United States, 61 F. 2d 843, 847 (8th Cir. 1932).
0 Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914).
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dwelling cannot be searched when the arrest takes place in front of the
dwelling house, 17 when the arrest takes place in the yard to the house,' 8
or when the arrest takes place in an automobile driving away from the
house. 19 It was only when the arrest took place within the home that
a search of it could be made without a warrant. In Agnello v. United
States20 the court disapproved a search of the defendant's home without
a warrant where the arrest of defendant took place in a neighbor's home
some distance away. "One's house cannot lawfully be searched without
a search warrant," said the court, "except as an incident to a lawful
21
arrest therein." (Emphasis added.)
Thus, the principal case stands alone in approving the search of the
home as incident to an arrest made outside the home.2 2 The court disregarded the criterion of reason generally applied by the courts limiting
the search to the necessities of the situation, i.e., the search of the
person and those immediate physical surroundings which may fairly be
deemed to be an extension of his person. The court appeared to rely
heavily on the "reasonableness under the circumstances" language of
Rabinowitz v. United States23 saying: "The Supreme Court indicated
that whether a search and seizure without a warrant is reasonable within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment depends upon the facts of each
particular case and is not a question easily answered by recourse to
' 24

mechanical tests."

It is true that Justice Minton in the Rabinowitz case said: "The
recurring question of the reasonableness of searches must find resolution in the facts and circumstances of each case. What is a reasonable
search is not to be determined by any fixed formula." 25 However, a
close study of that case reveals that the "fixed formula" to which Justice
Minton was referring was the requirement laid down previously in
Trupiano v. United States 6 which required officers to secure a warrant
wherever practical before making a search. Justice Minton went on to
say: "The test [of a reasonable search] is not whether it is reasonable to
1"Poulos
v. United States, 8 F. 2d 120 (6th Cir. 1925); Thomas v. State,
27 Okla. Crim. 264, 226 Pac. 600 (1924).
1I Wallace v. State, 42 Okla. Crim. 143, 275 Pac. 354 (1929) ; Fowler v. State,
114 Tex. Crim. 69, 22 S.W. 2d 935 (1930).
1 Papani v. United States, 84 F. 2d 160 (9th Cir. 1936).
20269 U. S. 20 (1925).
21 Id. at 32.
22In Patton v. State, 43 Okla. Crim. 436, 279 Pac. 694 (1929) where the defendant, seeing that he was about to be arrested, ran out the back door of his
home and was caught only twenty feet away, the court approved the incidental
search of part of the house on the ground that the arrest was so closely associated
with it that the arrest did virtually take place, or at least began within the house.
23339 U. S. 56 (1950).
2,4224 F. 2d 329, 330 (4th Cir. 1955).

2r339 U. S. 56, 63 (1950).
20 334

U. S. 699 (1948).
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procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable" ;27 and
in giving the reasons for holding the search there concerned reasonable,
he said: "The place of arrest was a business room to which the public,
including officers, was invited, the room was small and under the immediate and complete control of the defendant, and the search did not
extend beyond the room used for the unlawful purpose." (Emphasis
added.) 28 Therefore, even though Justice Minton used the phrase
"reasonable under the circumstances," he, nevertheless, applied the same
criterion of reason found in previous cases. Thus, it can be seen that
the Rabinowitz case neither extended the limits of search incident to
arrest nor set up a new criterion for determining the reasonableness of
such a search.
If homes can be searched and property seized as in the principal case,
and such property held and used as evidence against a citizen accused
of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his
right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value and
might as well be stricken from the Constitution. To permit a search of
the defendant's home when he is arrested outside the home is, in itself,
,an unreasonable extension of the right to search incident to arrest; but,
to permit his home to be searched as incident to the arrest of a third
party outside his home is an even greater encroachment upon the Constitutional guaranty; for in such a case the privacy of the owner is involved and not that of the arrestee.
JERRY

A.

CAMPBELL.

Evidence-Admissibility of Partially Inaudible Recordings
Since the ascertainment of truth is the ultimate aim of our judicial
system, and because memory plays an important role in helping to
realize that goal, it is not surprising that more and more scientific devices which aid in evaluating the uncertain memories of men have found
their way into the courts.' The use of sound recordings as a means of
proof is an example of how a scientific device can supplement or, in
2
some cases, supplant the testimony of human witnesses in litigation.
The problem of the introduction into evidence of mechanically preserved sound is not new. As far back as 1906, in a suit for damages
because of an alleged diminution of property value due to noise, the
2- Rabinowitz v. United States, 339 U. S. 56, 66 (1950).
2

8Id.at 64.
a discussion of the development of the use of scientific devices in the
courtroom, see Baer, Radar Goes to Court, 33 N. C. L. Rtv. 355 (1955).
' For a discussion of the problems and advantages involved in the use of magnetic tape recordings as a means of proof and as a means of recording courtroom
proceedings, see Conrad, Magnetic Recordings in the Courts, 40 VA. L. REV. 23
(1954).
1 For

